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ABSTRACT 
 
This study uses discrete-time survival analysis (DTSA) to examine the influence of fraudulent 
statements disclosure on the probability of financial distress not only in the initial period 
subsequent to disclosure, but future periods as well. Evidence indicates DTSA is superior to 
logistic regression and extends a richer depiction of the probability after a first-time fraudulent 
statement disclosure. After fraudulent statements disclosure, 24% of the reporting firms 
experienced financial distress in Year 1, with the hazard function declines progressively in 
subsequent years. We find total liability to total assets, directors and supervisors’ stock pledged 
ratio, and CPA (Certified Public Accountant) change are definitely linked to financial distress 
probability (p-value <0.05). A DTSA model not only includes financial ratios, but also considers 
corporate governance variables to produce more accurate classification than those of alternative 
models.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he growing number of financial statements restatements and mounting questions about corporate 
accounting practices appear to cause investors’ confidence in our financial reporting system to be 
shaky (GAO, 2002)
1
. Follow the initial restatement announcement, the stock price and earnings 
response coefficient drop significantly (Andersen and Yohn, 2002; Griffin et al., 2004) while lawsuit and 
bankruptcy probabilities rise (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004). Among these economic 
consequences, bankruptcy or financial distress seriously damage stockholder’s wealth. 
 
The firm, Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), independent auditor, or a combination thereof can 
identify a need for restatement. Palmrose et al. (2004) find that the stock price declines sharply if the SEC issues 
enforcement action (Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases; AAER) or if the company’s admits to 
misstatement due to fraud/irregularities, or if the restatement is initiated by auditor. They conjecture that with 
restatements initiated by an external party, investors question management’s integrity, which is likely to increase 
risk/uncertainty and may well degrade future company prospects. Disclosure of restatements elevates capital cost 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Hribar et al., 2004). They offer proof of different consequences from voluntary and 
                                                 
1 According to the GAO (2002) report ―Financial statement restatements trends, market impacts, regulatory responses, and 
remaining challenges‖ (p. 4): ―…The number of financial statement restatements identified each year rose from 83 in 1997 to 
220 in 2001. The proportion of listed companies on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq identified as restating their financial reports 
tripled from less than 0.89 percent in 1997 to about 2.5 percent in 2001 and may reach almost 3 percent by the end of 2002. 
From January 1997 through June 2002, about 10 percent of all listed companies announced at least one restatement...‖ Taiwan 
is similar to U.S.A.; the average percentage of financial statement restatements (trade in TSE and OTC market) is 2.6% during 
1997 to 2000 (Chen, 2002). 
T 
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mandatory restatements. Several papers about this issue recently examined SEC accounting enforcement action 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Griffin et al., 2004). Also, GAO (2002) only focuses on the accounting irregularity defined as 
the instance in which a company restates its financial statements due to the SEC’s address on accounting and 
auditing irregularities. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find companies with core restatements showing higher 
frequencies of fraud, SEC enforcement action, and bankruptcy or delisting. The correlation coefficient between 
fraud and bankruptcy or delisting is 0.27 (statistically significant). No corresponding study probes correlation 
between mandatory restatements and subsequent financial distress (or bankruptcy).  
 
This study deals with whether a fraudulent statement announcement can signal financial distress. We want 
to understand more deeply the impact of a mandatory restatement by the Taiwan Securities and Futures Bureau 
(TSFB) on financial distress, not only, in an initial period subsequent to disclosure, but also in future periods. For 
example, though disclosure does not precipitates any failure in the immediate subsequent period, the consequences 
thereof (higher capital cost, sharper drops in stock price, increased doubts of investor’s and banker’s etc.) could be 
accelerating the firm’s insolvency in future periods. To conduct our examination, we use discrete-time survival 
analysis (DTSA) (Cox, 1972) to obtain risk profiles illustrating the impact of the fraudulent statement disclosure on 
the firm’s subsequent existence. We do find that 24% of the firms that disclose financial statement misstatement 
failed in the year subsequent to disclosure. Also, the hazard function decreases over time. Total liability to total 
assets (TLTA), directors and supervisors’ stock pledged ratio (Pledge) and CPA change (CPA) markedly raise the 
likelihood of financial distress. We propose a model using financial ratios and corporate governance variables to 
yield classifications that provide a more accurate forecast than those of alternative models. Our results demonstrate 
that DTSA models as more appropriate than single period static models for forecasting financial distress. 
 
Our study represents an extension of prior research in two ways. First, we compare results among baseline 
hazard, discrete-time survival analysis and simple hazard models. Second, we examine the impact of corporate 
governance variables on financial distress. The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. The next 
section discusses extant empirical research on financial distress. Subsequent sections introduce discrete-time hazard 
models, define variables, and describe samples. Empirical findings are then reported and discussed. Finally we 
present our conclusions. 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Smith and Winkor (1935) first study corporate financial distress using financial ratios. The main statistical 
method used in earlier studies is univariate analysis, which represents works like Beaver (1966). Altman (1968) first 
applied the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) when screening stepwise five financial ratios as predicators 
mostly for building the Z-score model. Since the forecasting power of Altman’s Z-score model descends before firm 
goes bankrupt (two years before in some cases), Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) think that time and 
environmental factors affect the model’s predictive power (accuracy). Moreover, the model does not consider risk 
and size factors. Blum (1974) builds the corporate financial distress framework from the cash flow viewpoint using 
current profitability and variability indexes. Also, he was the first to include variability indexes in the model. 
 
Martin (1977) established a bank financial distress prediction model with logit regression to treat financial 
data that did not fit the assumptions of discriminant analysis. After Ohlson’s (1980) empirical evidence that logit has 
better forecasting power, more financial distress predicting models with logit or probit analyses emerged. Collins 
and Green (1982) examined the assumptions and properties of MDA (Altman, 1968; 1973 used) and quadratic 
discriminate analysis (QDA) (Altman et al., 1977 used), compared with the forecasting power of the linear 
probability model (LPM) (Pifer, 1970 used), and the MDA and logistic regression (LOGIT) (Martin, 1977 used). 
These methods were often applied to forecasting financial distress. The studies find that LOGIT reduces type I 
errors by one-half in a data set, and also improves forecasts. Tam and Kiang (1992) also find, though a neural-net 
approach that LOGIT remains the best classifier in terms of fewer type II and total errors over a one-year period and 
two-year span. 
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Similar to LOGIT, DTSA is a dichotomous choice model which assumes that firms face a choice between 
two alternatives, and that each particular situation relies on specific firms traits. Louwers et al. (1999) utilize DTSA 
to supply risk profiles illustrating the impact of going-concern disclosure on clients’ subsequent continuance and 
propose that DTSA exhibited a significant refinement over traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) and LOGIT, in 
that it not only estimates probability, but also the timing of event occurrence. Shumway (2001) argues that DTSA is 
more appropriate than single- or static multiple-period models when forecasting financial distress. Since firms 
change over time, prior models produce finance distress biased probabilities and inconsistent estimates of the 
probabilities they approximate. Most Taiwanese public firms are family controlled with a high degree of ownership 
concentration, similar to findings in other countries reported by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). In 
such a concentrated ownership environment, considering financial ratios alone is not enough. We also rate several 
variables about corporate governance in our model. 
 
DISCRETE-TIME SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
 
Most past research forecasting bankruptcy estimated single-period MDA and LOGIT regression models 
(Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980). These failed to account for the amount of time elapsed before event occurrence 
(Louwers et al., 1999). DTSA can partially alleviate data truncation problems inherent in most LOGIT and OLS 
studies. Therefore, we employ DTSA (Cox, 1972) to provide the impact of mandatory restatement disclosure on a 
company’s subsequent continuance. Analogous to logistic regression, DTSA is a dichotomous choice model that 
assumes a firm’s choice relies on specific characteristics and distinguishes between firms that fail earlier or later in a 
sample period. There are three reasons to prefer DTSA in forecasting. First, DTSA considers observations of those 
firms that did not trigger the event are rightly censored, since endpoints of a sample event horizon are unknown. 
Second, DTSA incorporates time-varying covariates, explanatory variables changing with time. Third, DTSA can 
yield more efficiency out-of-sample forecasts (Louwers et al., 1999; Shumway, 2001). 
 
This study’s event of interest is financial distress. An obvious starting point is the date of disclosed 
mandatory restatement. Assuming an observed starting point (t =0) for each firm (i =1, 2, 3….), observation 
continues until time T = ti, at which point either an event occurs or an observation is censored. Let Pit be the 
discrete-time hazard rate or failure rate, then the proportion of failure in each of several successive time periods is 
given by: 
 
 
itiiit
xtTtTP ,Pr  ,                                                             (1) 
 
where, T is the discrete random variable giving the uncensored time of event occurrence. Pit is the conditional 
probability that an event occurs at time t, supposing that it has not already occurred. On the other hand, survivor 
probabilities (Sit) represent firm i not undergoing financial distress in successive time periods (t) and can be 
formulated as: 
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                                                                  (2) 
 
Hazard probability depends on time dummy (D) and explanatory variables (X). The most popular 
presentation is a logistic regression function (Cox, 1972; Myers et al., 1973; Byar and Mantel, 1975; Brown, 1975; 
Thompson, 1977; Mantel and Hankey, 1978; Allison, 1982). 
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which can be taken as logarithmic transformation of both sides, a simplified form. The LOGIT discrete-time is 
written: 
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where (D1it + D2it + …+ DTit) are a series of time dummy variables, indexing years. The log-odds represent a 
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quantity associated with the hazard function in relation to the chance of (non-)failure. The discrete-time model has 
no single stand-alone intercept; alpha parameters (α1, α2,…αT) form multiple intercepts, one per time period. 
Interpretations of slope parameters (β1, β2,…βT) are similar to those in LOGIT; The slope indicates the effect of a 
one-unit difference of that predictor on the LOGIT-hazard. 
 
With all covariate values XT, set to zero, the population discrete-time hazard depends only on time 
dummies (D1, D2…DT). This model presents population baseline hazard function (Louwers et al., 1999), while a 
discrete-time hazard model depends only on explanatory variables (X1it-1, X2it-1,…XTit-1), called the simple hazard 
model (Kiefer, 1988; Lancaster, 1990, Shumway, 2001). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Before the 1960s, most papers define failure merely as bankruptcy. Beaver (1966) widens the scope: ―The 
firm is said to have failed when any of the following events have occurred: bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn 
bank account, or nonpayment of a preferred stock dividend.‖ Definition of failure (financial distress) is referenced 
by Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), and Blum (1974). ―Failure‖ is defined in this paper as inability to pay financial 
obligations as they mature. A firm is said to have failed when any of the following occur: bankruptcy, receivership, 
reorganization, bond default, an overdrawn bank account, nonpayment of preferred stock dividend, change in 
trading method to full delivery, and delisting. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Most past research forecasting bankruptcy considered financial explanatory variables only. This study also 
contemplates corporate governance variables and their impact on financial distress. Lee and Yeh (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that weak corporate governance aggravates probability for financial distress. We decide two 
dimensions of explanatory variables in this paper. Financial variables considered are mostly derived from a broad 
class of financial ratios, significant explanatory variables in past financial distress models. We select six variables 
classified into categories of liquidity (current assets to current liabilities, working capital to total assets), financial 
leverage (total liabilities to total assets, market value of equity to total assets), and profitability (net income to total 
assets, retained earnings to total assets). Variables relative to corporate governance included the stock pledge ratio, 
the chairman of the board also occupying CEO/president positions, auditor change and auditor opinion. 
 
Current Ratio (CACL) (-) = Current Assets to Current Liabilities 
 
The current ratio is an analysis tool for short-term liquidity and solvency. Beaver (1966), Ohlson (1980), 
Tam and Kiang (1992) include this variable in their models. The predicate sign is negative. 
 
Working Capital to Total Assets (WCTA) (-) 
 
Working capital to total assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of a firm relative to total 
capitalization. Liquidity and size are considered aboveboard. Altman (1968) thinks that a firm experiencing 
consistent operating losses will have shrinking current assets in relation to total assets. Beaver (1966) also includes 
this variable in his models. The predicate sign is negative. 
 
Liabilities Ratio (TLTA)(-) = Total Liabilities to Total Assets 
 
Liabilities ratio is common in pervious models (Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984; Beaver, 1966; Gombola et 
al., 1987; Theodossiou et al., 1996) for measuring financial leverage of firms. The predicate sign is negative. 
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Market Value Equity to Total Liabilities (MVTL)(-) 
 
Market value equity to total liabilities shows how much a firm’s assets decline in market value before 
liabilities exceed assets and the firm becomes insolvent (Altman, 1968). The measure’s reciprocal present the 
financial leverage of firms. 
 
Return on Assets (NITA) (-) = Net Income to Total Assets 
 
Return on invested capital is viewed as financing sources, using debt and equity capital (total assets), to 
gauge profitability. Models by Beaver (1966), Ohlson (1980), Lo (1986), Gombola et al. (1987) include this variable; 
predicate sign is negative. 
 
Retained Earnings to Total Assets (RETA)(-) 
 
Amount of retained earnings depends on long-term profitability and the established age of a firm. In 
essence, it is a measure of the true productivity of firm’s assets (Altman, 1968). Altman (1993) finds 47% of 
bankrupt companies’ had established ages below five years. We predicate that bad long-term profitability or shorter 
established years of firms will increase the financial distress probability. 
 
Stock Pledge Ratio (Pledge) (+) 
 
The value equals directors and supervisors report to the TSFB the percentage of their shareholdings 
pledged for loans and credits. Since pledging for loans reduces personal funds required, the degree of personal 
leverage expanded by managerial stockholder creates risk for companies. When the stock market collapses, 
managerial stockholders have motivation to maintain the stock price (their collateral). If corporate governance is 
weak, corporate funds represent the easiest and fastest funding for stock price support. Unfortunately, when stock 
markets continue to fall, companies are trapped in financial difficulties (Lee and Yeh, 2004). We predicate that 
directors, supervisors, and managers pledging stock with higher rate of firms will increase the financial distress 
probability. 
 
The Chairman of the Board also occupies CEO/President positions (CEO) (+) 
 
This is a dummy variable with a value of one if the chairperson of board holds the managerial positions of 
CEO or president, and zero otherwise. Because a chairman of the board conducts board of director meetings and 
oversees the process of hiring, evaluation and compensation of the CEO, Jensen (1993) argues for separating 
chairman and CEO/president positions if a board is to be an effective monitoring device. Predicate sign is positive. 
 
Auditor Change (Change) (+) 
 
Dummy variable has a value of one for new audit in the two years or less, and zero otherwise. Sorenson et 
al. (1983) imply that a client may even change auditors so as to reduce likelihood of detection of a financial 
statement fraud. Loebbecke et al. (1989) proffer evidence that 36 percent of the fraud in their sample were 
committed in the initial two years of an auditor’s tenure. Risk of audit failure and subsequent litigation is higher 
during an initial engagement than in subsequent years (Stice, 1991). Both Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) and Shu 
(2000) find auditor resignation positively associated with the likelihood of litigation. The predicate sign is positive. 
 
Auditor Opinion (OPINION) (+) 
 
Dummy variable equals one if a firm receives a standard unqualified audit opinion, zero otherwise. If a firm 
that had fraudulent statements receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, it means the financial statements 
were not presented fairly. This would lead to banks and investors questioning management’s integrity, which in turn 
would lead to financial distress. Predicate sign is positive. 
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Sample Selection and Data 
 
The financial statement fraud sample is limited to publicly traded firms because the study examines 
information only available in proxy statements and financial statements filed with the SEC (Beasley, 1996). 
Previous financial statement fraud papers, (the source is the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs)), issued by the SEC and the Wall Street journal Index (WSJ index) titled ―Crime – White Collar Crime‖ in 
U.S. Proxy of financial fraud in our study is a firm subject to accounting enforcement actions (mandatory 
restatements) by the TSFB, similar to U.S. SEC for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
 
We obtained samples from Taiwanese publicly traded companies, including Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
and computerized over-the-counter market (OTC). Samples were also obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal 
(TEJ) – Taiwan Company profile and information released by TSFB. Other financial and corporate governance 
information was found in TEJ. Stock pledge ratio was obtained from Info Times Database. Companies identified as 
ones against which the SEC has taken a mandatory act and which were reported to address accounting and auditing 
irregularities during 1995-2005. These were 103 in number, of which 27 suffered financial distress prior to 
occurrence of fraud, 15 belonged to the banking, securities or insurance industry. Two companies had incomplete 
information. The 59 firms with complete information are included in the sample of firms disclosing fraudulent 
statements. Table 1 (Panel A) records sample selection procedures, Panel B the distribution of event years. 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Composition 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Initial fraudulent statements disclosure identified, 1995-2005  103 
Less:    
Companies already in financial distress 27  
Companies belong to banks, securities or insurance firms 15  
Companies with incomplete information 2 (44) 
Total number of fraud firms included in study  59 
Panel B: Distribution of Event Years 
Year 
Fraudulent statements 
disclosure 
Financial distress No financial distress yet 
1995 7 1 6 
1996 8 1 13 
1997 3 0 16 
1998 9 1 24 
1999 7 0 31 
2000 5 8 28 
2001 3 2 29 
2002 3 3 29 
2003 5 1 33 
2004 5 4 34 
2005 4 3 35 
Total 59 24  
 
 
Panel C contains industry and market classification of samples. Firms were divided by industry except 
electronics and construction. We use χ2 to test the impact of different industry and trade market on event occurrence. 
We find phi value between industry of fraudulent firms and financial distress occurrence to be 0.39 (p-value =0.78). 
The phi value between fraudulent firm’s trading market and event occurrence is 0.128 (p-value = 0.32). Impact of 
different industries and trade markets on financial distress is not statistically significant. 
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Table 1: Sample Composition (Continued)  
Panel C: Industry and Market Classification 
Industry 
Financial distress No financial distress yet 
TSE OTC Total  TSE OTC Total  
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Food 3 12.50 0 0 3 12.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Plastic 2 8.33 0 0 2 8.33 0 0 1 2.86 1 2.86 
Textile 1 4.17 0 0 1 4.17 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.86 
Electric machinery 1 4.17 0 0 1 4.17 4 11.43 0 0 4 11.43 
Electric wire and cable 1 4.17 0 0 1 4.17 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.86 
Chemicals 0 0 1 4.17 1 4.17 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.86 
Steel 0 0 1 4.17 1 4.17 2 5.71 0 0 2 5.71 
Rubber 1 4.17 0 0 1 4.17 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.86 
Auto 1 4.17 0 0 1 4.16 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.86 
Electronics 5 20.83 3 12.50 8 33.33 13 37.14 2 5.71 15 42.86 
Construction 4 16.66 0 0 4 16.66 4 11.43 1 2.86 5 14.29 
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.85 
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.85 
Merchandise 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.86 0 0 1 2.85 
Total 19 79.17 5 20.83 24 100.0 31 88.57 4 11.43 35 100.0 
 
 
Panel D tabulates the number of financially distressed companies in each of the 11 years for an observation 
total of 301 firm-years. Out of 59 cases, 35 had no financial distress during that period and are considered censored. 
The fourth column of Panel D gives the number of firms that are at risk of financial distress, the number of 
right-censored, and the number of survivals in each year. For Year 1, all 59 firms are at risk. In Year 2, the number 
at risk diminishes by 16 (the number in financial distress plus the number of right-censored in Year 1). Thus, the 
number risky firms observed is 43.  
 
 
Table 1: Sample Composition (Continued)  
Panel D: Distribution of Survival Period 
Survival period (year) 
Number of financially 
distressed companies 
No financial distress yet 
Number at risk 
(Observation) Number of 
right-censored 
Number of 
survival 
1 year 12 4 43 59 
2 years 3 1 39 43 
3 years 0 5 34 39 
4 years 0 1 33 34 
5 years 4 2 27 33 
6 years 3 1 23 27 
7 years 0 4 19 23 
8 years 1 7 11 19 
9 years 1 1 9 11 
10 years 0 5 4 9 
11 years 0 4 0 4 
Total 24 35 242 301 
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents means, medians, standard deviations, maxima, and minima for all observations. 
Data do not conform to assumed normal distribution; Panel B shows results of Wilcoxon and Median tests. 
Financially distressed and non- distressed firms differ significantly (p< .05) in most variables. The size difference 
was insignificant, indicating both types of firms of similar size. Because most variables are deflated by total assets; 
the size variable also reveals a muticollinearity problem. Therefore, we exclude size from the model. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics For Selected Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Descriptive 
Variables 
Observation 
(Firm-year) 
N Mean Median STD Max Min 
CACL Financial Distress 24 1.76 1.12 2.52 12.21 0.35 
 No Financial distress yet  277 1.68 1.43 1.19 15.11 0.10 
 Total Firm-year 301 1.68 1.42 1.34 15.11 0.10 
WCTA Financial Distress 24 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.70 -0.31 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.53 -0.36 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.70 -0.36 
TLTA Financial Distress 24 0.59 0.60 0.22 1.08 0.07 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.42 0.42 0.16 0.88 0.05 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.44 0.43 0.17 1.08 0.05 
MVTL Financial Distress 24 2.45 0.91 6.28 30.76 0.08 
 No Financial distress yet  277 3.08 1.69 4.14 31.71 0.12 
 Total Firm-year 301 3.03 1.61 4.34 31.71 0.07 
NITA Financial Distress 24 -0.17 -0.12 0.18 0.04 -0.84 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.35 -0.24 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.35 -0.84 
RETA Financial Distress 24 -0.21 -0.18 0.22 0.06 -0.83 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.37 -0.59 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.37 -0.83 
Pledge Financial Distress 24 0.45 0.44 0.34 1 0 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.23 0.12 0.27 1 0 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.25 0.14 0.28 1 0 
CEO Financial Distress 24 0.38 0 0.49 1 0 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.24 0 0.43 1 0 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.25 0 0.44 1 0 
CPA Financial Distress 24 0.33 0 0.48 1 0 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.06 0 0.23 1 0 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.08 0 0.27 1 0 
Opinion Financial Distress 24 0.17 0 0.38 1 0 
 No Financial distress yet  277 0.45 0 0.50 1 0 
 Total Firm-year 301 0.43 0 0.50 1 0 
SIZE Financial Distress 24 22.51 22.80 1.10 24.69 19.31 
 No Financial distress yet  277 22.71 22.70 0.98 25.47 20.67 
 Total Firm-year 301 22.70 22.71 0.99 25.47 19.31 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics For Selected Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Panel B: Wilcoxon and Median test 
Variables 
Wilcoxon  Median  
Financial 
distress 
No financial 
distress yet Z Value 
Financial 
distress 
No financial 
distress yet Z Value 
CACL 111.04 154.46 -2.34** 0.33 0.51 -1.68* 
WCTA 122.00 153.51 -1.70* 0.42 0.51 -0.83 
TLTA 221.00 144.94 4.11*** 0.79 0.47  2.97*** 
MVTL 92.46 156.07 -3.44*** 0.13 0.53 -3.81*** 
NITA 39.33 160.68 -6.55*** 0.04 0.54 -4.66*** 
RETA 41.58 160.48 -6.42*** 0.00 0.54 -5.08*** 
Pledge 201.94 146.59 3.01*** 0.75 0.48  2.57** 
CEO 169.44 149.40 1.44 0.58 0.49 1.44 
CPA 189.17 147.69 4.77*** 0.64 0.49 4.77*** 
Opinion 112.08 154.37 -2.67*** 0.27 0.52 -2.67*** 
SIZE 144.29 151.58 -0.39 0.54 0.49  0.44 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively.  
CACL  = current assets to current liabilities.  
WCTA = (current assets less current liabilities) to total assets.  
TLTA = total liabilities to total assets.  
MVTA = market value equity to total liabilities.  
NITA = net income to total assets 
RETA = retained earnings to total assets 
Pledge = directors and supervisors report to the TSFB the percentage of their shareholdings that are pledged for loans and 
credits. 
CEO = a dummy variable with a value of one if the chairperson of board holds the managerial positions of CEO or 
president; other is zero. 
CPA  = a dummy variable with a value of one if new auditor in the two years or less; other is zero. 
Opinion = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s received a standard unqualified audit opinion; other is zero. 
SIZE = ln (total assets).  
 
 
Survival Function and Hazard Function 
 
From examining survival and hazard functions, a more precise description of the occurrence of financial 
distress emerges. Figure 1 (Panel A) illustrates the survival function  
ititit
PSS 

1
1
. When t = 0, no firm exhibits 
financial distress and the survival function equals ‖one‖. Over time, the survival function decreases in companies 
failing continuously. Figure 1 (Panel B) presents a hazard function; hazard rate (Pit) is conditional probability that an 
event occurs at time t. We use the square spline to present a smooth curve of hazard occurrence (Beck, Katz and 
Tucker, 1998). Obviously, a smooth curve of hazard declines over time. In Figure 1 (Panel B), about 24% of the 
firms with fraudulent statement disclosure triggered financial distress in the subsequent year. In fact, approximately 
50% of firms in this study are estimated to survive the entire study period. This result is interesting. A large 
percentage of the firms experience financial distress in Year 1. This means if the misstating firms already had 
existed financial problem, then subsequent to fraudulent statements disclosure the firms would fall into financial 
distress. 
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Figure 1: Graphs Of Survival And Hazard Function. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates, p-values, and goodness-of-fit statistics for the baseline hazard model. 
The baseline model is a logistic regression on event occurrence including only time dummies as independent 
variables. Model 1 includes all time dummy variables, 11 dummies (1995-2005); The Likelihood Ratio is highly 
significant (p<.01). R-square is 0.35 greater than .20 (McFadden, 1974), showing this model’s adequacy. Years 3, 4, 
7, 10, and 11 lack financial distress occurrence. So we combine them into a constant: Model 1A. Concordance of 
Model 1A is 83.5% higher than Model 1; R
2
 is only 0.08 (<0.2) lower than Model 1. Since Model 1A is a simple 
form of Model 1, we conduct a Likelihood Ratio test that compares models. We obtain ∆ L.R. = 280.03-55.27 = 
224.76 >
2
5 ,01.0
  = 15.09 indicating that Model 1 is preferable to Model 1A. Also, the abbreviated dummy variables 
make a significant (p<0.01) contribution. 
 
Table 3: Results Of Baseline Hazard Model 
Model 1:  
TitTitit
it
it DDD
P
P
 








...
1
ln
2211
 
Variable 
Model 1  Model 1A 
Parameter estimate Wald Chi-square Parameter estimate Wald Chi-square 
Intercept   -6.12 37.44*** 
D1 -1.45  18.80*** 4.67 19.59*** 
D2 -2.59  18.72*** 3.53 9.18*** 
D3 -15.20 0.00     --   -- 
D4 -15.20 0.00     --   -- 
D5 -1.98  13.79*** 4.14 13.35*** 
D6 -2.08  11.53*** 4.05 11.88*** 
D7 -15.20 0.00            --   -- 
D8 -2.89 7.91*** 3.23 5.08** 
D9 -2.30 4.82** 3.82 6.95*** 
D10 -15.20 0.00     --   -- 
D11 -15.20 0.00     --   -- 
LR index 280.03 (p <.0001) 55.27 (p <.0001) 
Model R2 0.35 0.08 
Concordant 32% 83.5% 
Discordant 60% 7.8% 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively. 
D1-D11 = Time dummy variables representing years subsequent to fraudulent statements disclosure. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2.   
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Table 4: Results Of Models  
Model 1Baseline Hazard Model:  
TitTitit
it
it DDD
P
P
 








...
1
ln
2211
                    
Model 2A Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Model (I): 
   ititTitTitit
it
it XXD...DD
P
P
ln   Governance Corporate Financial  






2211
1
 
Model 2B Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Model (II): 
   
itTitTitit
it
it XDDD
P
P
 Financial
 







...
1
ln
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Model 3A Simple Hazard Model (I):  
itit
it
it XX
P
P
ln   Governance Corporate Financial  





1
 
Model 3B Simple Hazard Model (II):  it
it
it X
P
P
ln  Financial 






1
 
Variables 
Exp. 
Sign 
Baseline Hazard DTSA (I) DTSA (II) Simple Hazard (I) Simple Hazard (II) 
Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 
Intercept  -- -- -- -- -- -- -8.95 21.27*** 1.46 28.56*** 
D1 - -1.45 18.80*** -8.76 11.13*** -6.68 11.43***     
D2 - -2.59 18.72*** -10.06 12.80*** -8.16 14.12***     
D3 - -15.20 0.00 -21.73 0.00 -20.24 0.00     
D4 - -15.20 0.00 -22.16 0.00 -20.73 0.00     
D5 - -1.98 13.79*** -10.13 11.06*** -7.10 11.52***     
D6 - -2.08 11.53*** -7.60 8.28*** -6.48 10.09***     
D7 - -15.20 0.00 -21.37 0.00 -20.10 0.00     
D8 - -2.89 7.91*** -9.05 12.36*** -7.84 13.71***     
D9 - -2.30 4.82** -7.88 7.97*** -7.02 7.78***     
D10 - -15.20 0.00 -19.20 0.00 -18.51 0.00     
D11 - -15.20 0.00 -19.51 0.00 -18.88 0.00     
CACL -   0.52 0.20 0.71 0.55 0.61 0.42 0.63 0.66 
WCTA -   3.26 0.72 2.08 0.47 3.24 0.96 2.32 0.76 
TLTA +   0.07 3.96** 0.07 4.71** 0.06 5.89** 0.07 10.26*** 
MVTL -   -0.12 0.07 -0.23 0.37 -0.13 0.10 -0.16 0.27 
NITA -   -19.18 10.53** -14.44 9.89*** -19.18 15.14*** -15.79 14.22*** 
RETA -   -0.65 0.04 -3.82 2.17 -0.99 0.13 -1.88 0.61 
PLEDGE +   2.97 4.45**   2.44 5.56**   
CEO +   0.63 0.47   0.23 0.10   
CPA +   3.14 6.85***   2.53 7.97***   
OPINION -   -0.50 0.27   -0.79 1.06   
LR index 
280.03 
(p <.0001) 
358.95 
(p <.0001) 
344.83 
(p <.0001) 
128.37 
(p <.0001) 
110.98 
(p <.0001) 
Model R2 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.18 0.16 
Concordant 32% 84.7% 75.1% 97% 96.5% 
Discordant 60% 15.3% 24.8% 2.7% 3.3 % 
∆LR  
358.95 - 344.83 
= 14.12 >
2
4,01.0
 (p <.01) 
128.37 – 110.98 
= 17.39 >
2
4,01.0
 (p <.01) 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively. 
a. The coefficient of estimated of the model.  
D1-D11 = Time dummy variables representing years subsequent to fraudulent statements disclosure. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 4 depicts results of the baseline hazard, discrete-time survival analysis, and simple hazard models. 
For greater explanatory power, we add financial and corporate governance variables to baseline hazard: i.e., DTSA 
(I). Coefficient estimates for total liability to total assets (TLTA), directors and supervisors’ stock pledged ratio 
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(Pledge) and CPA change (CPA) change significantly, positively correlated to financial distress (p-value <0.05). Net 
income to total assets (NITA) shows strong negative correlation to any incidence of financial distress (p-value <0.05). 
Model 3, the simple hazard model is restricted to  t  not considering the time dummy variable. The coefficient 
estimate of Model 3 is similar to that of Model 2. 
 
To understand the contribution of corporate governance variables, we compare Model 2A with 2B and 3A 
with 3B. We find the model including corporate governance variables to be better than one only having financial 
variables. This finding is consistent across all kinds of model indexes. The Likelihood Ratio test also proves Model 
2A (3A) to be superior to Model 2B (3B) in statistical significance (0.01). This finding supports the concept that 
corporate governance variables add more explanatory power to the models. As for valuation among various models, 
the concordant index of simple hazard (I) is the highest among these models. But we notice that the simple hazard (I) 
model’s R2 is lower than 0.2, which is below the requirement. Instead, the DTSA (I) is the best model in terms of the 
LR index and model R
2
. While the simple hazard (I) is the simple form of DTSA (I). We also conducted the 
Likelihood Ratio test to compare these two models to obtain ∆ L.R. = 358.95-128.37 = 230.58> 2
10  0.01,
 . Therefore, 
the resulting DTSA (I) is better than the simple hazard (I) model and we selected it as the best model. 
 
Classification Accuracy Test 
 
This paper is limited in a few financial distress samples. We apply the Jackknife method instead of the 
holdout sample forecasting test to forecast classification accuracy. The Jackknife method attempts to examine result 
replicability without reconducting the same study with a new sample (Crask and Perreault, 1977; Tukey, 1958). It 
was commonly used for clinical research that lacked enough data. In this method, sometimes called the 
"leave-one-out" method, one observation is removed and the rule repeated many times to determine the frequency 
with which the excluded one is misclassified. Use of the Jackknife approach has been demonstrated to produce more 
conservative and less biased estimates of true population chacteristics (Crask and Perreault, 1977). 
 
 
Table 5:  Classification Accuracy By Jackknife Method 
Hazard Rate 
Baseline Hazard DTSA (I) DTSA (II) Simple Hazard (I) Simple Hazard (II) 
FDa NFDb FDa NFDb FDa NFDb FDa NFDb FDa NFDb 
Very low risk 
group ( <0.01) 
0 
( 0.0%) 
109 
(39.4%) 
2 
( 8.3%) 
208 
(75.0%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
181 
(65.3%) 
3 
(12.4%) 
179 
(64.6%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
121 
(43.7%) 
Low risk 
group 
(0.01-0.05) 
2 
( 8.3%) 
0 
( 0.0%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
29 
(10.5%) 
0 
( 0.0%) 
50 
(18.1%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
49 
(17.7%) 
3 
(12.5%) 
95 
(34.3%) 
Middle risk 
group 
(0.05-0.10) 
10 
(41.7%) 
58 
(20.9%) 
2 
( 8.3%) 
14 
( 5.1%) 
5 
(20.8%) 
14 
( 5.0%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
13 
( 4.7%) 
2 
( 8.3%) 
24 
( 8.7%) 
High risk 
group 
(0.10-0.20) 
11 
(45.8%) 
110 
(39.7%) 
0 
( 0.0%) 
9 
( 3.2%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
13 
( 4.7%) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
20 
( 7.2%) 
3 
(12.5%) 
20 
( 7.2%) 
Very high risk 
group ( >0.20) 
1 
( 4.2%) 
0 
( 0.0%) 
19 
(79.2%) 
17 
( 6.1%) 
17 
(70.8%) 
19 
( 6.9%) 
18 
(75.0%) 
16 
( 5.8%) 
15 
(62.5%) 
17 
( 6.1%) 
Total 
24 
(100%) 
277 
(100%) 
24 
(100%) 
277 
(100%) 
24 
(100%) 
277 
(100%) 
24 
(100%) 
277 
(100%) 
24 
(100%) 
277 
(100%) 
a. Number and percentage of financially distress firms that were correctly classed in the different risk groups. 
b. Number and percentage of non financially distress firms that were correctly classed in the different risk groups.  
 
 
In Table 5 we report the classification accuracy using the Jackknife method for our various models. The 
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301 observations (firm-years) are divided into five groups according to hazard rate, ―very low risk group‖, ―low risk 
group‖, ―middle risk group‖, ―high risk group‖ and ―very high risk group‖. We find classification accuracy of DTSA 
(I) to be the best among these models. The percentage of financially distress firms that were correctly classed in the 
very high risk group is 79.2% and that of non-distressed ones correctly classified as very low risk is 75%. If we 
combine very high/low risk with high/low risk group, then the classification accuracy ratio of the financially 
distressed (versus non-distressed) firms is 79.2% (85.5%). 
 
DTSA Model Compare with LOGIT Model 
 
This section compares the DTSA selected model with LOGIT. Since the model is single period, we estimate 
via last observation of each firm: i.e., total observations of 59 firms (Table 6). Model 1A is derived from Model 1B, 
combined with corporate governance variables. Its indexes are notably better. The logistic regression Model 1A is 
presented by the equation: 
 
OPINION 27.0CPA  06.1 CEO 85.0PLEDGE 00.4                                        
RETA  85.6NITA  07.9 MVTL 51.0TLTA 67.11 WCTA03.6CACL 14.033.101)  distress   (FinancialPr 


 (5) 
 
where, the dependent variable equals one if financial distress is present, zero otherwise. Other independent variables 
are as depicted above. Only two, TLTA and Pledge, coefficients are positive and statistically significant (p<0.1). 
Contrasted with DTSA (I), the LOGIT Model 1A fits will. The model R
2
 equals 0.57, a concordance rate above 95%. 
These indexes exhibit preferable fitness of LOGIT Model 1A. We then rate classification accuracy of DTSA (I) and 
LOGIT Model 1A using the Jackknife method.  
 
 
Table 6: Results Of Logit Model 
OPINIONCPA CEOPLEDGERETA NITAMVTLTLTAWCTACACL
1
ln
10987654321
 








it
it
P
P  
Variable 
Model 1A Model 1B 
Parameter estimate Wald Chi-square Wald Chi-square p-value 
Intercept -10.33 5.34** -7.20 4.93** 
CACL 0.14 0.02 -0.17 0.03 
WCTA 6.03 1.36 4.71 1.59 
TLTA 11.67 3.65** 9.91 4.55** 
MVTL 0.51 2.13 0.45 2.00 
NITA -9.07 0.62 -5.77 0.43 
RETA -6.85 0.49 -9.10 1.60 
PLEDGE 4.00 3.39*     -- -- 
CEO 0.85 0.30     -- -- 
CPA 1.06 0.52     -- -- 
OPINION 0.27 0.04     -- -- 
LR index 49.38 (p <.0001) 40.43(p <.0001) 
Model R2 0.57 0.50 
Concordant 95.4% 93.1% 
Discordant 4.6% 6.8% 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2.  
 
 
The results of classification accuracy using the Jackknife method appear in Table 7. While the percentage 
of financial distress firms correctly classed as very high risk group is 87.5%, the classification accuracy of a LOGIT 
model for non financial distressed firms is very low (only 20%). Clearly, if the evaluation of the model only relies 
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on these statistic indexes (i.e. LR, R
2
 and concordant), then the judgment of a model will be biased. Usually, a 
LOGIT model has more frequent type I errors. It was quite obvious that the DTSA model is preferable classification 
accuracy over the LOGIT model. 
 
 
Table 7: Risk classification table by Jackknife Method 
Hazard rate 
DTSA (I)  
(n: 301 Firm-Years) 
LOGIT 
 (n: 59 Firms) 
Financial distress No financial distress yet Financial distress Non financial distress  
Very low risk group 
(   <0.01) 
2 ( 8.3%) 208 (75.0%) 1 ( 4.2%) 7 (20.0%) 
Low risk group 
(0.01-0.05) 
1 ( 4.2%) 29 (10.5%) 2 ( 8.3%) 8 (22.9%) 
Middle risk group 
(0.05-0.10) 
2 ( 8.3%) 14 ( 5.1%) 0 ( 0.0%) 7 (20.0%) 
High risk group 
(0.10-0.20) 
0 ( 0.0%) 9 ( 3.2%) 0 ( 0.0%) 2 ( 5.7%) 
Very high risk group 
(   >0.20) 
19 (79.2%) 17 ( 6.1%) 21 (87.5%) 11 (31.4%) 
Total 24 (100%) 277 (100%) 24 (100%) 35 (100%) 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provides new evidence regarding the influence of fraudulent statements disclosure on the 
probability of financial distress, not only in the initial period subsequent to disclosure, but in future periods as well. 
By using discrete-time survival analysis, we develop a hazard model to forecast financial distress. The DTSA is 
theoretically superior to previous static models. It corrects for period at risk and allows for time-varying covariates. 
It uses all period data to yield financial distress probability estimates for all firms at each point in time, and thus 
avoids the selection biases inherent in single period models. DTSA provides a more comprehensive perspective, 
indicating that 24% of firms that disclosed financial statement misstatements failed in the subsequent year, and the 
survival function wanes over time. This paper uses discrete-time survival analysis to evaluate the link between 
fraudulent statement disclosures and financial distress. Past research in forecasting financial distress mostly gauges 
financial explanatory variables. This study weighs corporate governance variables versus financial distress 
probability. The variables included stock pledge ratio, board chairman also occupying CEO/president positions, 
auditor change and auditor opinion; all contribute additional explanation. After estimating baseline hazard, DTSA, 
and simple hazard models on a dataset of financial distress observed in firms after fraudulent statement disclosures 
over 11 years in Taiwan, we found the DTSA model to be most appropriate in terms of classification accuracy using 
the Jackknife method. The coefficient estimates for total liability to total assets (TLTA), net income to total assets 
(NITA), directors and supervisors’ stock pledged ratio (Pledge) and CPA change (CPA) correlate strongly with 
financial distress (p-value <0.05). As for DTSA versus single period LOGIT, the classification accuracy is consistent 
with Shumway (2001) and supports the assertion that hazard models are more appropriate than single period models 
in forecasting bankruptcy.  
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